Exploring the link between corporate governance and innovative capacity in the Australian superannuation industry by Backhouse, K & Wickham, M
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 14, Issue 4, Summer 2017 
 
32 
EXPLORING THE LINK BETWEEN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATIVE CAPACITY IN 
THE AUSTRALIAN SUPERANNUATION INDUSTRY 
 
Kim Backhouse*, Mark Wickham* 
 
*Tasmanian School of Business & Economics, University of Tasmania, Australia 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
How to cite this paper: Backhouse, K. 
and Wickham, M. (2017). Exploring the 
link between corporate governance and 
innovative capacity in the Australian 
superannuation industry. Corporate 
Ownership & Control, 14(4), 32-40. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv14i4art3 
 
Copyright © 2017 by Virtus Interpress 
 
*This work is licensed under the 
Creative Commons Attribution 
International License (CC BY 4.0). 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/b
y/4.0/ 
*The license will be activated starting 
from June, 2018 
 
ISSN Online: 1810-3057 
ISSN Print: 1727-9232 
 
Received: 04.01.2017 
Accepted: 06.03.2017 
 
JEL Classification: D22, G34 
DOI: 10.22495/cocv14i4art3 
 
In a large-scale single industry case study, insights are provided 
into corporate governance factors affecting innovative capacity in 
the superannuation industry in Australia. Analysis of the data 
indicated that the major corporate governance factors driving 
innovation in the industry included: ‘possessing a progressive 
organisational culture’, ‘emphasis on marketing-orientation’, and 
‘engaging in co-opetition’. Similarly, the data indicated that the 
major corporate governance factors inhibiting innovation 
included: ‘possessing a conservative/risk-averse organisational 
culture’, ‘unwillingness to deviate from a strict interpretation of 
regulation’, ‘emphasis on a profit-orientation’, and ‘the absence of 
any formalised innovation processes within the firm’. These 
findings are used to develop a ‘theory of innovation’ link between 
corporate governance approaches and innovative capacity in the 
Australian superannuation industry. Although this study is limited 
in its scope, it does represent an initial exploration of the critical 
relationship that exists between Board-level functions and the 
ability of a superannuation firm to innovate in the Australian 
context. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Whilst the importance of ‘effective governance’ and 
‘innovative capacity’ in the superannuation1 (i.e. 
‘pension scheme’) industries in Western economies 
is well established in the literature (King Committee 
on Corporate Governance, 2002; Clark, 2003, 2004, 
2006; Urwin & Clarke, 2009), the link between 
corporate governance and innovative capacity in that 
industry has not been investigated to any significant 
degree (Ambachsheer, 2007). O’Sullivan (2000) and 
Lazonick (1998) were arguably the first researchers 
to attempt to establish a theoretical link between 
governance and innovative capacity; they found that 
without a ‘theory of innovation’ to draw upon, the 
link between corporate governance, innovative 
capacity and economic performance could not be 
made. In order to address this issue, this research 
examines the link between corporate governance 
and innovative capacity in the fourth largest 
superannuation industry in the world (i.e. the 
Australian superannuation industry). As at 2012, the 
Australian superannuation industry accounted for 
                                                          
1 As a matter of terminology, the Australian usage of the term 
superannuation is unique compared to other countries, where the 
corresponding term used for the provision of benefits upon retirement is 
pensions. For the purposes of this paper, the term superannuation is used 
throughout. 
twenty-one per cent of total Australian financial 
sector assets, approximately 120 per cent of the 
Australian share market capitalisation, and 90 
percent of Australia’s annual gross domestic 
product (KPMG, 2012).  
The superannuation industry is highly 
competitive in Australia; clients have many 
investment and administration options (e.g. 
balanced portfolio of industry funds, choice of 
managers in master trusts, individual shares 
holdings, bonds in small self-managed funds etc.). 
The main competitive measure in the Australian 
market is return on investment; however, 
competition has also been based on more innovative 
measures (i.e. new or significantly adapted products 
and services) that seek a point of positive 
differentiation in a crowded marketplace (e.g. 
investment philosophy, specialised expertise and the 
type of service offered (Rice & McEwin, 2002)). Given 
the demonstrable importance of the superannuation 
industry to the Australian economy, and the need 
for Australian superannuation firms to innovate 
effectively in order to remain competitive in a 
strictly regulated environment, this research seeks 
to investigate the following broad research 
opportunity: What corporate governance factors 
impact innovative capacity in the Australian 
superannuation industry? 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In order to address this important research 
opportunity, it was necessary to examine the manner 
in which the three dominant theories of corporate 
governance (i.e. ‘Agency’, ‘Stakeholder’, and 
‘Stewardship’ theories) conceptualised the link 
between effective governance and innovative 
capacity. After reviewing the three theories, 
however, it became apparent that each remained 
silent about how the requirements of developmental, 
organisational and strategic resource allocation 
impacted on a corporation’s innovative capacity. 
From an Agency Theory perspective, for example, 
adequate monitoring or control mechanisms need to 
be established to protect the principals’ (i.e. the 
members of any superannuation fund) from 
managerial conflicts of interest – the so-called 
‘agency costs’ of modern capitalism (Fama & Jensen, 
1985). O’Sullivan (2000) points out that the 
empirical problems of Agency Theory are rooted in 
its tenets; far from providing an analysis of the 
relationship between corporate resources and 
innovation, it makes no attempt to deal with 
innovation and its implications for resource 
allocation. She further contends that “…financial 
economists make no attempt to deal with innovation 
and its implications for resource allocation” (2000, 
p. 89).  
Similarly, the Stakeholder Theory of corporate 
governance is based on the notion that there are 
many groups in society besides owners and 
employees to whom the corporation is responsible 
(Blair, 2004). Blair (2004) contends that the 
corporate governance should recognise the central 
importance of investment in human assets to the 
success of the organisation and the prosperity of the 
economy. Wang, Dewhirst and Dudley (1992) 
considered that this theory can best explain how 
members of the governing board think about the 
interests of corporate constituencies and therefore 
how organisations are actually managed. 
Stakeholder Theory has been used to describe the 
nature of the firm and the way managers think 
about managing (Brenner & Molander, 1977), how 
board members think about the interests of 
corporate constituencies (Wang, Dewhirst & Dudley, 
1992) and how corporations are actually managed. 
In summary, this theory offers a different 
perspective of corporate governance that provides 
useful insights for theoretical development for the 
platform of corporate governance, yet it is silent on 
the issue of resource allocation and any possible link 
with innovation within the organisation.  
Stewardship Theory of corporate governance is 
underpinned by the assumption that managers are 
inherently trustworthy individuals who will, by 
default, be ‘good stewards’ of corporate resources 
under their control (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; 
Donaldson, 1990). The theory contends that superior 
corporate performance will be most strongly linked 
to the action of a majority of directors as they work 
to maximise profit for their shareholders. The 
reasoning behind this is that directors understand 
the business they govern better than independent 
directors and so can make better decisions 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Donaldson, 1990). 
Stewardship Theory requires formal board 
structures that empower managers through 
structures that integrate decision management with 
decision control (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 
1997). The theory posits that non-executive directors 
do not always have the expertise and inside 
knowledge of executive directors to effectively 
contribute to strategic decision-making. Whereas, 
executive directors offer direct working knowledge 
and experience (Kesner & Johnson, 1990). Arguably, 
boards are likely to be better informed about the 
sources of uncertainty and the potential returns 
stemming from innovative projects. According to 
Donaldson (1990), there is no motivational problem 
or non-alignment of interest between management 
and ownership, and the governing board will be 
responsible mainly for the setting of strategies for 
the organisation. This theory is not without 
criticism; for example, Tricker (1994, p. 56) notes 
that the Stewardship Theory “…ignores the 
dynamics of boards, interpersonal perceptions of 
roles and the effect of board leadership”. 
Donaldson’s (1990) view is important with respect to 
contemporary leadership practices for the 
requirement of the CEO and the board of directors 
or trustees in an overall corporate governance 
framework. In relation to the relationship between 
corporate governance and innovation, Stewardship 
Theory remains similarly silent and presents no 
implications for resource allocation within a 
corporate governance framework in this regard. 
Given the silence that each of the three 
dominant theories on the relationship between 
corporate governance and innovation, there is a 
need to locate a more appropriate theoretical 
framework for the purposes of addressing the broad 
research opportunity. The Managerial-Control 
perspective of strategic management advanced by 
Porter (1996) was deemed appropriate for this 
purpose, as it recognises the integral role that 
managers play in corporate resource allocation. Akin 
with Agency Theory, the Managerial-Control 
perspective views managers as agents of 
shareholders; however, it recognises the need for 
managers to make innovative investments if their 
enterprise is to achieve sustained competitive 
advantages. The Managerial-Control perspective 
argues for managerial autonomy in setting and 
implementing investment strategy and looks to 
wealthy shareholders (i.e. superannuation funds) to 
become “patient capitalists” - that is, to provide their 
managers with the control over the financial 
resources needed for innovative investment 
strategies. Unlike the dominant theories described 
above, therefore, this perspective includes the 
concept of ‘innovation’ as a central issue to its 
concept of resource allocation within the corporate 
governance framework. The advocates of the 
Managerial-Control perspective recognise that the 
competitive success of the organisation depends on 
economic and cultural investment in innovation, 
which among other things, involves specialised in-
house knowledge, time and financial commitment. 
The difficulty with this perspective, as O’Sullivan 
(2000) points out, is that there is no systematic 
explanation of the conditions under which managers 
will make investments that promote innovation and 
those under which such investments will not be 
made. In order to address the broad research 
opportunity, whilst simultaneously addressing the 
shortcoming of Porter’s (1996) Managerial-Control 
perspective in the superannuation industry context, 
this study poses the following specific research 
questions: 
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RQ1: What corporate governance mechanisms 
positively impacted the innovative capacity of firms 
in the Australian superannuation industry? 
RQ2: What corporate governance mechanisms 
negatively impacted the innovative capacity of firms 
in the Australian superannuation industry? 
The research questions were formulated to 
achieve two specific and concurrent outcomes. 
Firstly, their answers will provide a basis for 
understanding the corporate governance factors that 
impact (both positively and negatively) on firms’ 
innovation capacity in the Australian 
superannuation industry. Secondly, their ancestors 
will provide the basis for developing a model of 
salient corporate governance issues and their impact 
on the innovative capacity of firms in the Australian 
superannuation industry. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to address these research questions, this 
study comprised a series of semi-structured 
interviews with senior executives (i.e.  CEOs, 
trustees, Chairmen, Board members) from 20 (out of 
a population of 45) Australian superannuation firms 
in 2008 - all of which were registered as members of 
the Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 
in 2015. Of the 20 CEOs interviewed in this study: 20 
were in charge of ‘industry-based’ funds; and 2 were 
in charge of the ‘government-based’, ‘corporate-
based’ and ‘public offer-based’ funds respectively 
(see Table 1 for a summary of the respondents and 
their superannuation funds).  
 
Table 1. Summary of the superannuation funds represented in the study 
 
Superannuation 
Fund Type 
Characteristics n = 
Number of 
Clients (approx.) 
Funds Under 
Management (approx.) 
Industry-based 
 
Usually open for anyone to join. Some are 
restricted to employees in a particular industry. 
14 5,000,000 AUD$140b 
Government-based 
Created for employees of Federal and State 
government departments. 
2 300,000 AUD$15b 
Corporate-based 
Managed by an employer, for their employees. 
Some larger funds are 'employer-sponsored' - i.e. 
the employer also operates the fund under a 
board of trustees. 
2 200,000 AUD$15b 
Public Offer-based 
Includes commercial funds and trusts, although a 
standard employer-sponsored fund (such as an 
industry fund) may opt to be treated as a public 
offer fund 
2 1,000,000 AUD$30b 
Total  20 6,500,000 AUD$200 billion 
Given the exploratory nature of the research 
questions, we provided the semi-structured 
interview questions in advance to the respondents 
so that the senior executives could prepare their 
responses in advance (i.e. it allowed time for the 
respondents to gather their own internal 
information and reflect on how their firm’s 
corporate governance measures and/or approaches). 
In addition to this, it allowed the researchers to 
focus the interviews on the specific elements of the 
research questions (i.e. what corporate governance 
measures they believed increased their firm’s 
innovative capacity, as well as those they believed 
inhibited or constrained it). The semi-structured 
interview questions (see Table 2) were designed to 
cover the necessary issues but were framed in an 
open-ended manner, to allow the respondents 
sufficient latitude for introspection and open 
reporting of their own perspectives. As a result, the 
respondents were free to pursue those matters that 
they considered important.  
 
Table 2. The semi-structured interview questions 
 
№ Question 
1 Describe the nature and extent of innovation in the superannuation industry. 
2 To what extent does your firm gather intelligence about competitor innovations? 
3 What do you believe are the drivers of innovation in your firm? 
4 What do you believe are the inhibitors of innovation in your firm? 
5 To what extent does the Board of Directors in your firm play a role in the innovation process? 
6 To what extent do trustees play a role in the innovation process? 
7 To what extent does your firm measure the impacts of its innovation processes? 
8 To what extent does government regulation of the superannuation industry impact the innovation process in your firm? 
9 What other external factors that impact on innovation in your firm? 
 
In total, twenty semi-structured interviews were 
conducted, each of which lasted between 60 and 120 
minutes. The semi-structured interview questions 
were formulated to facilitate the aggregation, 
analysis, and validation of information, and the 
approach enabled the researchers to interrogate 
evidence gathered from secondary sources. For 
these purposes, secondary data were collected from 
the representative firms’ Annual Report 
documentation (for the years 2003/4 – 2008/9) as 
they related to ‘Board of Directors membership’, 
‘corporate governance’, ‘compliance with industry 
regulations’, ‘financial performance’ and ‘innovation’ 
(e.g. new product developments, changes in 
marketing strategy, new corporate processes etc.). In 
order to triangulate the data collected from the 
respondent firms, secondary data concerning the 
same issues were collected from independent 
external financial sources (i.e. The Australian 
Financial Review and the national Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation’s Kohler Report) over the 
same time period. 
Each of the primary interview transcripts and 
secondary data sources was subject to a rigorous 
content analysis process that followed the protocol 
proposed by Finn, White and Walton (2000). The 
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content analysis and the verification of the 
conclusions drawn were facilitated by the use of the 
NVIVO (version 10) software package. Computer 
software programs such as NVIVO are of significant 
value in qualitative analysis and any subsequent 
theory building (Richards & Richards, 1995; 
Wickham & Woods, 2005). During the first stage of 
the content analysis, the aims and objectives of the 
research were identified, and the first-round coding 
rules were developed. Coding refers to the process 
of converting information into contextual values for 
the purposes of data storage, management and 
analysis allowing theme identification (Ticehurst & 
Veal, 2000). This research used the literature review 
as a guide to initially organise the data by the 
variables listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. First-round coding variables and definitions 
 
Node Coding Rules 
Aspects of corporate governance linked 
positively to innovative capacity 
This node captures any data that links corporate governance 
factors/policies/procedures positively with innovative capacity within the firm. 
Aspects of corporate governance linked 
negatively to innovative capacity 
This node captures any data that links corporate governance 
factors/policies/procedures negatively with innovative capacity within the firm. 
In the second stage of the content analysis, all 
of the interview transcripts and secondary data were 
converted into MS Word™ format and entered into a 
codified NVIVO database. In the final stage of the 
content analysis, the coded data were further 
interrogated to detect any significant themes that 
emerged in terms of the drivers and inhibitors of 
innovative capacity as they related to corporate 
governance measures (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Second-round coding variables and definitions 
 
Node Second-round coding (Emergent Themes) 
Aspects of corporate governance linked 
positively to innovative capacity 
A progressive organisational Culture 
Top-management-led innovation agenda 
An emphasis on marketing-oriented decisions at the Board of Directors level 
Engaging in Co-opetition 
Aspects of corporate governance linked 
negatively to innovative capacity 
A conservative/risk-averse organisational culture 
Unwillingness to deviate from a strict interpretation of regulation 
An emphasis on profit-oriented decisions at the Board of Directors level 
The absence of any formalised innovation processes within the firm 
 
At regular intervals throughout the analysis, 
inter-coder reliability checks were taken to ensure 
that the data were coded consistently with the 
coding rules set in the first stage of the content 
analysis. The inter-coder reliability checking process 
for this research was based on the three-stage 
process recommended by Compton, Love and Sell 
(2012): firstly, the researchers developed and pre-
tested the coding rules against all of the primary 
data gathered from the interviews (and as per the 
coding rules in Table 3). Secondly, the researchers 
developed an agreement as to how ambiguous data 
were to be handled (i.e. instances where data could 
either be coded into more than one code or where 
the data did not readily fit into an existing code). 
Thirdly, the researchers determined the level of 
inter-coder reliability achieved in the coding process 
by calculating its Krippendorff’s Alpha. The 
researchers selected Krippendorff’s Alpha as the 
measure as it is flexible enough to be used for any 
number of coders, and it can be used for 
determining the coding reliability of a wide range of 
(nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio) data.  Typically, 
the Krippendorff’s Alpha score needs to exceed 
0.800 in order for the coding results to be 
considered reliable and replicable; the 
Krippendorff’s Alpha score for this research was 
calculated as α = 0.940.  
In order to generate the necessary empirical 
knowledge, memos were maintained about the data, 
the first and second-round coding categories, and 
the relationships between them as they emerged 
(Wilson, 1985). Appendix 1 provides a summary of 
how the data were interrogated and how the validity 
of the relationships between the categories was 
verified through the memo analysis process. NVIVO 
has a facility for the creation and retention of such 
memos for later consideration and analysis. Utilising 
the memo capability within the NVIVO package, 
memo reports were generated by the software after 
second-round coding. From these reports, the trends 
and emerging themes became clearer. The themes 
emanating from the second-round of coding form 
the basis of the results section that follows. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
The broad research opportunity in this study was to 
develop a theoretical model that describes the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
innovative capacity of firms in the superannuation 
sector. After reviewing the literature, the broad 
research opportunity was expressed as two specific 
research questions; the answers to these two specific 
research questions are presented below and form 
the basis of the theoretical model presented in this 
paper. 
RQ1: What corporate governance mechanisms 
positively impacted the innovative capacity of firms 
in the Australian superannuation industry? 
The second-round coding of the interviews and 
secondary data sources revealed three corporate 
governance mechanisms that positively impacted the 
innovative capacity of firms in the Australian 
superannuation industry: a progressive 
organisational culture (i.e. a CEO/Board of Directors-
led innovation agenda), the emphasis of the 
marketing orientation at the Board of Directors level, 
and a willingness to engage in co-opetition. 
 
4.1. A progressive organisational culture – 
CEO/Board of Directors-led innovation agenda 
 
The first corporate governance mechanism that 
positively impacted the innovative capacity of the 
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superannuation firms sampled in this study related 
to the progressive organisational culture generated 
and perpetuated by a CEO/Board of Directors-led 
innovation agenda. This CEO/Board Directors-led 
innovation agenda had a two-fold effect: firstly, it 
set the tone for the role of industry regulation in the 
strategic decision-making process at the Board of 
Directors-level: 
«We [the senior executives of the fund] are not 
fussed by regulation… We just get the approval of 
the Board and the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority, if necessary. We are not stifled by 
corporate governance in any way.   
…it the right environment to spawn innovation; 
otherwise you may be stifled by the regulatory 
environment. 
Culture comes down to whether they see it as 
business or service.  Where you stand on that 
spectrum determines level of innovation… 
innovation in this industry is about member services 
and using your abilities to deliver better service to 
members». 
Respondent data indicated that industry 
regulation need not be viewed as a constraint on 
innovative capacity, but rather a framework that 
enabled the superannuation firms to engage 
proactively and positively with the relevant 
regulatory bodies. Thematic analysis indicated that 
respondents believed that a functional and proactive 
working relationship with the regulatory bodies 
created a relationship of trust and information flow 
that allowed the superannuation firm to test the 
boundaries of what regulatory bodies would be 
willing to accept in terms of innovation and new-
product development. Secondly, the progressive 
organisational culture positively reinforces the idea 
that innovative activity (most notably in the form of 
new-product development, and new-process 
development) was a desired and generously 
rewarded work product throughout the firm: 
«Innovation is valued … and encouraged during 
the induction process for all staff members of this 
fund. 
…innovation is driven by the CEO and the 
Executive team when they develop their business 
plan». 
The progressive organisational culture 
underpinned by a CEO/Board of Directors-led 
innovation agenda had a flow-on effect to the HRM 
functions of the superannuation firm (i.e. the 
recruitment and selection, training and 
development, and compensation and benefits) that 
attracted and retained employees with a greater 
propensity for innovation in the industry. Similarly, 
the progressive organisational culture had an impact 
on the marketing strategies of the superannuation 
firms, which is discussed in the next section. 
 
4.2. An emphasis on marketing-oriented decision-
making at the Board of Directors level 
 
The second corporate governance mechanism that 
positively impacted the innovative capacity of the 
superannuation firms sampled in this study related 
to the marketing orientation that underpinned Board 
of Directors-level decision processes. Respondent 
data indicated that the greater the focus on 
determining and acting of customer/client needs the 
greater the level of innovative services and new 
products that were developed by the firms: 
«…understanding the role of new technology is 
an exciting development – it gives our members the 
opportunity to ‘carry’ their super around with them.  
No longer will funds have to rely on its members 
reading the information in their statements, visiting 
their website or ringing their call centre. 
Insights into the market led us to develop the 
first interactive online calculator of its kind in 
Australia. 
When the Storm [Australian national Rugby 
League team] they are playing, their games are 
beamed into pubs and clubs where our members are 
actually working. Given the youth demographics of 
our members, the average age is 29, our members 
are probably out enjoying themselves …and 
watching the teams …we’re sponsoring. Sponsoring 
sporting teams makes perfect sense and gives us 
greater bang for our dollars». 
Similarly, the recognition that the 
superannuation firms needed to positively 
differentiate themselves in an increasingly crowded 
marketplace raised the level of competitive rivalry 
within the superannuation industry; this, in turn, led 
to the recognition that ‘innovative activity’ was 
actually a strategic necessity: 
«… a number of the industry funds they are 
starting to develop complex products as they are 
looking at competing with retail funds… and 
industry funds have the belief that more complex 
products will help them compete.  
This makes a huge difference…now we target 
different messages and allocate resources more 
efficiently to align with members’ needs. This fund 
is innovative in the segmentation of work and 
development of portfolio analysis. 
Large public offer funds have to be innovative 
otherwise members will simply join other funds». 
In addition to this, the establishment of defined 
market positions encouraged international financial 
institutions to approach them with strategic 
investment opportunities, further freeing up the 
corporate resources and capabilities needed to offer 
even greater levels of innovation: 
«…Our sheer size had attracted a large 
Investment bank, Goldman Sachs [located in the 
United States] which had gained market knowledge 
of the fact that this particular fund had an appetite 
for infrastructure assets, and directly approached 
the fund… this had dramatically cut costs as 
exorbitant fees had been paid to third parties who 
traditionally manage or brokerage deals within the 
industry». 
The increased level of competitive rivalry in the 
Australian superannuation industry (which included 
a greater emphasis on marketing research, market 
positioning, and competitor intelligence gathering) 
had a subsequent effect on firm interrelationships, 
which is discussed in the next section. 
 
4.3. Willingness to engage in co-opetition 
 
The third corporate governance mechanism that 
positively impacted the innovative capacity of the 
superannuation firms sampled in this study related 
to the willingness of the Board of Directors to 
engage in co-operative marketing strategies (i.e. “co-
opetition”). Respondent data indicated that the 
innovative capacity of individual firms was 
significantly augmented by the pooling of resources 
and experience between firms: 
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«A good example of innovation was created 
where resources had been pulled together to 
establish an asset consultancy business for industry 
funds. 
Innovation has been created where resources 
have been pulled together and established. 
Innovation is created within industry funds by 
pooling resources and creating collective vehicles 
[like the Frontier joint-venture». 
Respondents noted that co-opetition was most 
effective in increasing a firm’s innovative capacity in 
two specific circumstances: firstly, where it allowed 
an individual firm to develop new products and 
services for their existing clientele (and with no 
cannibalisation of the cooperating firm’s clientele); 
and secondly, where it enabled all of the cooperating 
firms to attract new clientele simultaneously.  
RQ2: What corporate governance mechanisms 
negatively impacted the innovative capacity of firms 
in the Australian superannuation industry? 
The second-round coding of the interviews and 
secondary data sources revealed four corporate 
governance mechanisms that negatively impacted 
the innovative capacity of firms in the Australian 
superannuation industry: a conservative/risk-averse 
organisational culture, an unwillingness to deviate 
from a strict interpretation of industry regulation, 
the emphasis on profit-oriented decisions at the 
Board of Directors level, and the absence of any 
formalised innovation processes in the firm. 
 
4.4. A conservative/risk-averse CEO/Board of 
Directors 
 
The first corporate governance mechanism that 
negatively impacted innovative capacity related to 
the conservative nature of the firm’s CEO/Board of 
Directors. Respondent data indicated that the 
composition of the Board of Directors (and perhaps 
more accurately, their attitude towards risk) had the 
most significant impact on superannuation firms’ 
innovative capacity. The data suggested that the 
main issue was the role that ‘risk-averse group-
think’ played at the Board level – respondents noted 
that whilst only a percentage of Board members 
were likely to be significantly risk-averse in any 
given firm, their conservatism had a greater ability 
to influence decisions than those Board members 
that were more progressive in this particular 
industry: 
«Essentially, the industry is expected to be risk 
averse and there is an expectation that our Board on 
behalf of the fund membership should make 
conservative decisions. 
If one board member was uncomfortable with 
the motion about to be resolved by the majority of 
the trustees, then the entire board ‘would fold’ on 
that particular decision. 
In relation to investment choices, I felt 
pressured into putting funds under management 
into the property and not innovation as a reaction to 
the market.   
There is a general lack of desire to innovate 
due to the current board composition». 
Respondents also suggested that when 
conservatism and risk-aversion was prevalent at the 
Board level, it negatively diminished the innovative 
capacity of firm’s culture in three main ways: firstly, 
the signals sent from the firm’s senior executives 
emphasised conservatism as the preferred strategic 
stance in the firm’s decision-making (thereby 
signalling what types of activities would be rewarded 
and promoted in the firm); secondly, that any 
progressive or risk-averse ideas and discussions 
would be quickly shut down by conservative 
factions; and lastly, it perpetuated a fear of making 
mistakes (and lack of clarity about who would be 
blamed and what the punishment might be) amongst 
the firm’s employees: 
«The culture does not support innovation 
through any strategic leadership, the vision of the 
Board or from any formal platform at an operational 
level.   
…it is extremely difficult to arrive at any 
constructive decision for the fund, let alone making 
any decision in relation to innovation.   
I’m not sure where blame would lay with any 
innovation stuff ups… 
We were here to serve the members’ best 
interests and innovation does not centre on that». 
 
4.5. Unwillingness to deviate from a strict 
interpretation of industry regulation  
 
The second corporate governance mechanism that 
negatively impacted innovative capacity related to 
the unwillingness of the CEO/Board of Directors to 
deviate from strict interpretations of industry 
regulation. Respondent data indicated that the 
impact that industry regulation has on the 
innovative capacity of superannuation firms is 
dependent on the extent to which their Board’s 
perceive it as being a strict set of rules (as opposed 
to ‘rigourous guidelines’), and the extent their 
Board’s perceive it as requiring strict interpretation 
and adherence: 
«Innovation is difficult in this sector... the 
fiduciary duty of a trustee runs counter to 
innovation. 
We are unable to be innovative due to 
restrictions placed on us by current industry 
regulations…this industry is too over-regulated to 
support innovation. 
One of the negative consequences of corporate 
governance is that it is an inhibitor of innovation». 
That the greater the level of unwillingness to 
deviate from a strict interpretation of industry 
regulation, the less capacity the firm had (1) to work 
alongside regulatory bodies (if and when the need 
arose), and (2) to innovate effectively in response to 
opportunities and threats in the marketplace. 
 
4.6. An emphasis on short-term profit-oriented 
decision-making  
 
The third corporate governance mechanism that 
negatively impacted innovative capacity related to 
the decision-making process being underpinned by a 
profit-oriented perspective at the Board of Directors-
level. Respondent data indicated that the more 
corporate governance decision-making emphasised 
controls on cash flows and returns-on-investment, 
the less was emphasised innovation and new 
product development: 
«Our fund used a system for innovation; we 
focus our efforts in this process on passing through 
various ‘gates’. Stage one involves asking the 
question ‘does it fit with sustainable products?’ 
Stage two involves a risk assessment process, and if 
there is an unmitigated risk to profit then they will 
not continue with the process. 
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The mandate is that industry funds have low 
costs, which automatically mean less innovation as it 
would cost money to develop innovative solutions 
and money to service innovative solutions. 
…the industry doesn’t have an ‘innovation 
focus’ or ‘new product development focus’…rather 
just a ‘growth focus’». 
This finding effectively mirrors that associated 
with marketing-oriented decision-making discussed 
earlier; it suggests that achieving an optimal level of 
innovative capacity in this industry requires a 
balance be struck between a dependence on profit-
oriented decision-making (which emphasises cash 
flow be generated from a set of extant 
products/services) and marketing-oriented decision-
making (which emphasises new product 
development and innovations in terms of 
products/services).  
 
4.7. Absence of any formalised innovation processes 
 
The fourth corporate governance mechanism 
negatively impacted innovative capacity related to 
the absence of any formalised innovation processes 
within the firm. Respondent data indicated that the 
lack of any formalised innovation processes meant 
that employees had no means and/or motivation to 
engage readily with other employees about new 
ideas, products and services. This lack of structural 
support for innovation resulted in institutionalised 
disconnects between employees and their array of 
potential ideas: 
«…we did not really have a product 
development process to engage with, so we didn’t 
bother.  
There was no formal pipeline to promote new 
product development or any innovative idea within 
that culture …the process to date was random and 
ad hoc. 
…no formal pipeline to promote new product 
development or any innovative idea within the 
culture of their fund and the process to date was 
random and ad hoc». 
In addition to this, any innovations that were 
adopted by the firms with no formalised innovation 
processes were by necessity ad hoc in nature, and 
not nearly as effective, nor resource efficient, as they 
could have been. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The exploratory findings have, in part, contributed 
to a theoretical understanding of the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and 
innovative capacity in the Australian superannuation 
industry.  Figure 1 presents a model of this 
relationship based on the primary and secondary 
data analysis conducted in this study and suggests 
two important implications for theory and practice. 
Firstly, the results suggest that specific corporate 
governance mechanisms in of themselves did not 
impact the innovative capacity of superannuation 
firms in Australia, but rather the underlying 
philosophy driving their implementation did. For 
example, each of the senior executives reported that 
their firm’s corporate governance mechanisms 
served to fully comply with industry regulation – yet 
despite this, there were differences in the manner in 
which regulatory compliance impacted the firms’ 
innovative capacity. Firms whose Board of Directors 
approached their regulatory compliance obligations 
with a progressive, marketing-oriented stance 
demonstrated a greater ability to use it to their 
competitive advantage than did those that 
possessed a conservative, profit-oriented stance. 
This underlying philosophy had the same 
differential effect across all of the corporate 
governance mechanisms in this study. 
 
Figure 1. Modelling the relationship between corporate governance and innovative capacity in the Australian 
superannuation industry 
 
 
 
Secondly, the underlying approaches to 
corporate governance mechanism implementation 
did not operate on a mutually exclusive basis; the 
findings of this study suggested instead that they 
operated on a continuum (i.e. it was important how 
much the firm’s culture was progressive, not simply 
that it was progressive). Similarly, the data 
demonstrated that it was possible for an individual 
firm to possess seemingly dichotomous 
organisational cultures (i.e. be simultaneously 
progressive and conservative), depending on factors 
such as type of corporate governance mechanism, 
time of financial year that a corporate governance 
issue occurred, shareholder sensitivities/demands, 
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external stakeholder pressure, etc. The study also 
supported that the continuum notion applied to the 
other underlying philosophies as well (i.e. that 
innovative capacity was dependent on the extent to 
which any particular corporate governance 
mechanism was underpinned by a marketing/profit-
orientation; the level of willingness to deviate from 
industry regulation; the extent that there are 
formalised innovation processes; and the level of 
willingness to engage in coopetition). To sum up, 
this research provides preliminary support for the 
notion that the innovative capacity of firms in the 
superannuation industry is a function of the trade-
offs between approaches to corporate governance, 
rather than the corporate governance mechanism 
itself; all firms must have sound corporate 
governance mechanisms in place, but it appears the 
degree to which the philosophies discussed in this 
paper combine that is the critical link to innovation. 
 
5.1. Limitations and future research opportunities 
 
The findings of this study are based on the 
perspectives of the senior executives in a sample of 
20 of Australia’s listed superannuation firms. As 
such, they serve a limited purpose in building our 
understanding of the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the innovative capacity 
of firms in the superannuation industry. Although 
this study is limited in its scope, it does represent an 
initial exploration of the critical relationship that 
exists between Board-level functions and the ability 
of a superannuation firm to innovate in the 
Australian context. Further research is needed, 
therefore, that focuses on the experiences of other 
corporate governance actors in the Australian 
context (e.g. Board members, shareholders, 
shareholder activists, superannuation employees 
etc.) would assist in developing a finer-grained 
model than the one presented here. The 
complexities of the relationship also deserve further 
large-scale investigation (i.e. how different national 
cultures and government regulatory environments 
affect the relationship), as do the roles of important 
influencers of corporate governance decision-
making (e.g. trustees, the media, shareholders, 
shareholder activists, financial analysis etc.). 
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Appendix 1. Processes for data interpretation 
 
Tactic Procedure 
Noting patterns  and themes 
When observing phenomena, gestalt psychology holds that people tend to perceive events in 
their entirety rather than their constituent parts. Therefore, as data relating to the aspects of 
corporate governance that positively or negatively impacted innovative capacity were 
interrogated using text-based search functions, recurring patterns and themes were noted in 
order to consolidate individual facets of the information. 
Seeking  plausibility 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 246) suggest that drawing inferences “…often happens during 
analysis that a conclusion is plausible, ‘makes good sense’, ‘fits’ … so plausibility, and intuition 
as the underlying basis for it, is [valuable].” The plausibility of the corporate 
governance/innovative capacity model (Figure 1) was determined by comparing the emergent 
data patterns against the independent secondary data that triangulated the CEO interviews 
data. 
Clustering 
Organising primary and secondary data into clusters aids in its interpretation by grouping 
themes that have similar characteristics. In this research, the clustering of data culminated in 
the determination of interconnected themes (i.e. the emergent themes noted in Table 4), which 
formed part of the second-round coding process. 
Noting relationships between 
variables 
Determining the nature of the relationship between the independent variable (i.e. the corporate 
governance mechanisms/approaches/strategies adopted) and the data relating to innovative 
capacity in the superannuation firms allowed the researchers to ascertain how these variables 
change directly, change inversely, or demonstrated no relationship at all. 
Finding  intervening variables 
An intervening variable is one that theoretically affects the observed phenomenon but cannot 
be observed directly. When variables in this inquiry seemed to be related but provided an 
unsatisfactory explanation, the data was interrogated/triangulated further for possible 
intervening variables. 
Making conceptual or 
theoretical coherence 
Having gleaned evidence from the data that appeared to form converging patterns and identify 
relationships, the theory was inducted from that evidence. 
This table is adapted from Miles and Huberman (1994) 
 
